Tactical Weakness?

Bending with the wind, March 14 was apparently neither shocked nor awed.

A new theory that is gaining currency is that March 14 intentionally turned the other cheek (and handed their weapons) to let Hezbollah and its allies fall into a trap. Here are some of the arguments being made to support that theory:

From Lebanon Updates: “Hezbollah’s failed Shock and Awe”:

In retrospect, March 14’s rather unexpected giving up its locations to the Army was quite a smart thing to do, assuming Hezbollah won’t fight the army’s present in March 14’s regional offices. This effectively takes away the violence option from Hezbollah.

That leaves Hezbollah with two problems: one is that time is running out so they have to take the initiative, something the guerrilla organization doesn’t have much experience with: changing from countering Israel’s aggression towards defining the agenda requires a change in approach that it might find difficult to make.

Second, up until now, Hezbollah has pretty much always used violence as its strategy of last resort negotiations. Now with the Army stepping in, that card is of the table, leaving Hezbollah with little choice but to explore new ways of getting what it wants: true dialogue.

Guy Bechor, Ynet News: Nasrallah lost, for now:

Just like in the crisis of December 2006, when tens of thousands of Shiites besieged Siniora’s government palace, the same happened this time around: Prime Minister Siniora adopted the tactic of weakness. This is the same tactic he used against us during the Second Lebanon War, when he broke into tears in order to exert international pressure on Israel.

Siniora is a true artist when it comes to understanding the Middle East. He did not fall into the trap of Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah and did not unleash the Lebanese army against Hizbullah’s fighters. Had he done so, Nasrallah would have taken advantage of it and really taken over Beirut. Instead, Siniora allowed Hizbullah to enter areas it doesn’t belong in, thus making Nasrallah fall into a trap himself.

And of course, the previously mentioned Rex Brynen of McGill University:

First, there was the 2006 war, which Hizbullah clearly did not foresee (although it was quite foreseeable). As it turns out they secured their “divine victory” because the Israelis made even more serious mistakes, but it certainly wasn’t a triumph of strategic master thought.

Then there was the withdrawal from cabinet, and the “tent camp” siege of the government–which turned out to NOT to have the rapid and decisive effect that Hizbullah intended. Nasrallah seems to have never anticipated that he would simply be ignored, and that it would be business as usual in the Grand Serail.

Finally, there is the take-over of West Beirut. While the rather foolish and incautious cabinet decisions were the cause of this, I think it was also driven by Hizbullah’s continuing inability to leverage M14 as much as they wanted to. The withdrawal of fighters from the street (albeit, after some very thuggish behaviour by their Amal and SSNP proxies) was clearly intended to spin this all as a reluctant Hizbullah with a national agenda (rather than a sectarian move), they’ve clearly underestimated the effect in the Christian community where it has all done substantial damage to Aoun (a fact that even his most loyal deputies are privately admitting). Given that the Christian community is the only one in play–the Shiite, Sunni, and Druze communities are all pretty much solidly behind the Hizbullah/Amal, Mustaqbal, and the PSP respectively, and now even more so–the long term result could be a politically weakened M8. Ironically, this comes at a time when M14’s weak government performance were causing it some real problems with its constituents–however, events in Beirut will now counter that with a “rally around the (sectarian) flag” effect.

It is also possible that the M14 groups will now do some serious arming and training (despite all the accusations, their past efforts have been VERY limited and haphazard), probably with Saudi/Jordanian/Egyptian support–not really in Hizbullah’s long-term advantage.

Finally, what does Hizbullah do if M14 just ignores Hizbullah’s obvious preeminent military power? I suspect they’ll do exactly that: not soften on the “presidential package” (next cabinet/PM, new electoral law), leaving Hizbullah no better off than before. Indeed, given the damage M8 has taken in non-Shiite communities, in a few months it could even be in a somewhat worse position.

In short, I think this is far from being an unalloyed masterstroke of strategic brilliance.

Elie Fawaz’s article at Michael Totten’s blog:

“So, we know that Hezbollah’s well-trained fighters are in control of most of west Beirut. The decision taken by Walid Jumblat and Saad al-Hariri not to fight back in Beirut, but rather hand most of their positions to the army ended any illusion regarding the sanctity of the “resistance” — that it would never turn its weapons inward, for now its hands are dripping with the blood of innocent Lebanese. But it’s different in the Chouf where Jumblatt’s forces bloodied Hezbollah.

And finally top it with a personal “i told you so”

“shock and awe” is a deliberate tactic by Nassrallah for cowing the Lebanese. If we are neither shocked, nor awed, we will take away Hezbollah’s psychological advantage. If on the other hands March 14 fights fire with fire, they will help feed Hezbollah’s supporters’ sense of victimization and prolong their “resistance”.