De-Facto Dissociation?

The critics of PM Mikati’s policy of dissociation are loud and relentless (this blog included). MTV has even dedicated a TV feature to a quote by Desmond Tutu: “If you are neutral in situations of injustice, you have chosen the side of the oppressor”.

But as I watched yesterday’s demos, I couldn’t help but notice that even March 14 is somewhat complicit in dissociation. Yesterday’s turnout in the rival demonstrations was exclusive to Salafis and Baathist. The demonstrators were not joined by other mainstream anti-Syrian (Future Movement) and pro-Syrian (Hezbollah) parties. It was as if there was an agreement behind the scene between the FM and Hezbollah not to show up. Why? Because that would contribute to social unrest in Lebanon and nobody wants that.

I don’t know about you, but avoiding an anti-Assad demonstration to prevent civil strife sounds like textbook dissociation to me.

As an aside, yesterday’s exercise in controlled democracy –where extreme marginal parties were given a space to let off steam without affecting the system or the balance of power in any way– is a testimony to the sophistication of the political game in Lebanon and its ability to manage tension.

❊ The Future Movement Needs More Than Distancing Itself from The Salafis. It Needs To Stand Up To Them

– A Threat? –

The Lebanese Salafis are feeling confident. They are emboldened by the rise of Islamists in the Arab world and by the void in Lebanese Sunni politics that Mr. Saad Hariri has left behind.

They are making a play for power. They are coming up with charismatic leaders, organizing demonstrations and are getting louder than ever. Today’s demonstration is their first in Beirut, and they are getting a sympathetic ear in March 14 media because they are expressing the people’s anger against the monstrous Syrian regime.

The good news is that they’re not about to dominate Lebanese Sunni politics any time soon. They don’t own media conglomerates and they are far from Lebanese mainstream public opinion. But they can cause great harm to the Future Movement (FM), a movement which until recently was the de-facto umbrella movement for most Sunni parties in Lebanon.

The FM likes to sell itself as the voice of Sunni moderation, an image that is diametrically opposed to that of the Salafis. And yet whenever the Salafis show up in public events, The March 8 propaganda machine manages to portray them as an extension of Hariri’s embattled political empire.

This is bad because it’s scaring Christians and other minorities who are sitting on the fence and watching how Islamists in the Arab world (and Nigeria) are massacring Christians and driving them away. And yet the FM, beholden to the Saudis who also support the Salafis, can’t pull off anything more than issuing weak statements to distance themselves from the hardliners.

In the past, the FM got away with cozying up to the Islamists, but in today’s world this is complete folly. Future TV and Almustaqbal newspaper should keep featuring moderate Muslims lambasting the medieval thinking of the Salafists, their antiquated treatment of women, their penchant for violence and their deeply intolerant beliefs. The salafis should be constantly attacked, ridiculed, made fun of until any association with them becomes an embarrassment to any average Lebanese Muslim.

Also: Lebanon’s Suspended Sunnis.

Dissociation à la Gemayel

In a somewhat misleadingly titled piece, the Daily Star reports that “Gemayel backs Lebanon’s dissociation policy”:

“This has been my policy [dissociation] from the start. If the government adopts it, that’s good. Principle and logic compel me to adopt this position. I don’t like the term dissociation but [prefer] positive neutrality, one that truly isolates the Lebanese scene from sharp divisions born of conflicts with strategic dimensions,” Gemayel, the head of the Kataeb party, told Al-Akhbar newspaper in an interview published Monday.

This does indeed sound as if Gemayel is joining the Mikati bandwagon on Syria, but the crucial difference, the difference that makes Gemayel’s position more honorable and one that I can easily stand behind, is that he is not afraid to call things by their own names:

In the interview, Gemayel also reiterated that his party supported the “Syrian revolution.” “Nobody paid the price of the ‘barbarism’ of the Syrian regime like our party and family did and this is a primary and sufficient reason for us to support and stand in solidarity with the Syrian revolution with our calls, which are spontaneous emotional and political cries,”

Can you imagine Mikati ever using those words? Herein lies the crucial difference between a true policy of positive neutrality, a pragmatic approach to complex political events that doesn’t prevent you from expressing your honest opinions, and Mikati’s so-called dissociation, which is nothing more than subservience to the position of the Syrian regime disguised as neutrality.

Yes, a Feminist Political Party Would Be Useful

After writing my previous post, I read this report by Dana Khraiche in the Daily Star about the possibility of forming a feminist political party in Lebanon.

In reaction to the idea, the previous Minister of Finance Rayya el Hassan, said:

I’m not necessarily against it but I don’t see how such a party could be a benefit

Allow me to make the case to Ms. Hassan on why such a party would actually, tangibly be beneficial. I am under no illusion that people would vote in mass for such a party. But as I argued before, the very fact that such a party exists will threaten to take votes away from mainstream parties. In competitive districts this will put pressure on dominant parties to address issues of female representation to avoid losing the votes of one-issue voters.

In other words, without actually winning elections, parties like a would-be feminist party can influence politicians to embrace their cause. This process is already under way in part because of pressure from feminist activism. Parties like the LF are starting to include internal quotas for women. Having an actual feminist party will kick off such efforts into higher gear.

❊ The National Dialogue. A Waste of Time or a Chance for Hezbollah to Bow Out?

– For a change, this could be useful –

From an editorial in Now Lebanon:

The national defense strategy is a chimera, a function that allows the Party of God to maintain its weapons while appearing to side with reason and debate. Does he honestly believe that Hezbollah would put its weapons at the disposal of the state when they are the very stick that allows it to beat the state whenever it feels like it?

I made that same argument before, but I think this conventional wisdom is worth revisiting in the wake of what’s happening in Syria and Iran nowadays: What if the national dialogue was Hezbollah’s chance to disarm without losing face?

Maybe this sounds too optimistic and more like a stretch of imagination. But let’s assume a regional war against Iran and an implosion of the Syrian regime take place in the coming years. With its two military crutches broken, wouldn’t Hezbollah prefer to transition into the role of normal Lebanese party that advocates a different kind of resistance –namely moral and economic– against Israel?

It would be a mistake to humiliate a weakened Hezbollah considering the place it has in the hearts of many in the Lebanese Shiaa community and considering the danger it could pose if it found itself cornered. A grand Lebanese bargain, as Michael Young had suggested in a previous National column, could be the wise course of action to take:

an increasingly insecure Hizbollah is also potentially a dangerous one. Now is the time for the party’s Lebanese rivals to consider innovative ideas for integrating Shiites into the political system. One such idea is to offer a swap – Hizbollah’s weapons in exchange for more political power for the Shiites – in the framework of a broader reform effort.

For reasons of self-interest, if not compassion, the rest of the Lebanese would do well to give Hezbollah a ladder to climb down on. The national dialogue would be the perfect theater to stage such an honorable exit

The Lebanonization Of the SNC?

Hanin Ghaddar:

The Syrian National Council is suffering from March 14 syndrome. The obsession with power and media attention ruined their ability to stand up for the people, who are the main reason the revolution still has momentum. Exactly like March 14, the SNC still cannot agree on what kind of state they want after Assad leaves power.

Although I see her point, I’m not sure this is a fair characterization of what ails March 14 and the SNC. These parties don’t have a vision problem: They both envision a democratic country with a level playing field where one party cannot impose its will on the other with weapons and physical violence. The problems they’re facing are execution and the temptations of vanity and power.

Also, it is unfair to compare March 14 to the SNC. When there was an big, obvious injustice committed against the Lebanese (assassination of a prime Minister), the people united and got together in the form of March 14 and faced the threat. When the injustice became more subtle and less visible (Hezbollah’s long-term threat to the Lebanese state), the unity gave way to politics as usual. It is unforgivable that the SNC is behaving now –as the Syrian people is being bombed to smithereens– like March 14 are behaving after a long bout of fatigue and politics-as-usual.

❊ March 14′s Giant Leap of Faith

Ex PM Saad Hariri at Biel today:

Lebanon is headed towards a new political phase due to the Arab Spring and the beginning of the end of the Syrian regime [...] I will bear the responsibility of my solidarity with the Syrian people.

With these words, Mr. Hariri thrust into the spotlight the greatest political gamble of March 14′s life.

– We’re in this together –

In essence, the group previously known as the “anti-Syrian camp” is now betting its future on the demise of Assad, expecting it to bring a transformation in Lebanon that will bring back normalcy to political life. (i.e a situation in which Hezbollah can no longer dictate its terms based on the power of its arms). Pick your metaphor: They’re burning the boats, they’re betting the farm, they’re not looking back, they’re taking the plunge…You get the idea.

I’m not sure how I feel about this. On one hand, I can’t see any way in which the Assad family will survive in power. March 14 might as well back the regime’s opponents and reap the political dividends of the change at the top. Moreover, the perception of inevitability could by itself help tip the balance, and most Arab governments, Arab media, the west and even Walid Jumblat have already thrown caution to the wind and burned all their bridges with the Syrian regime.

On the other hand this can be a very risky move. The situation in Syria is far from clearcut and could get messy for a really long time. Does March 14 really want to stake everything on a neat outcome in which one Syrian side triumphs over the other? What if things dragged on and got really grubby? Let’s assume that after the elections of 2013 March 14 get a thumping majority and form a government while Assad is still in power. Would it back its rhetoric with action, abandon Lebanon’s current policy of dissociation and allow the country to become a safe haven for the Free Syrian Army? What if Syria got divided into statelets? What if Syria had a power-sharing agreement in which the NSC’s relationship with March 14 will have to be sacrificed? Can March 14 guarantee that Lebanon won’t be dragged into the conflict in all its ugliness and chaos?

It might sound like I prefer Mikati’s current non-alignment policy, but I really don’t because I believe it’s not an honest policy and that it is a front for a discreet pro-Assad bias. I just hope that the strategists of March 14 are preparing contingency plans for the various potential outcomes in Syria. This is a dangerous game and the future of our peace and stability is at stake. I hope they know what they’re doing.

❊ Why I Liked Hariri’s Interview Yesterday

I’ve been harsh on Mr. Saad Hariri before, but I think the man had a very good interview yesterday. This is not an analysis post, just a quick what-went-through-my-head-while-watching thingy.

I’m sure Mr. Hariri left a lot to be desired, but here are a few observations on why I think he did a good job:

  • The anger is gone. He feels more relaxed and less spiteful in tone, body language and talking points. He was even coy when he was asked about the possibility of a future electoral alliance with PM Mikati in Tripoli. The bitterness, it seems, is something he decided he’s better off without.
  • He gave Nadim Koteish and Paula Yakoubian a lot of leeway in asking tough, sometimes embarrassing questions. Yakoubian was almost harassing him towards the end and Koteish maintained a skeptical attitude and countered Hariri’s responses with good comebacks questions. Of course, we’re not talking about a hostile interview (after all, he handpicked the people who did it), but kudos to him for coming as close as possible to a “real” TV interview.
  • He was forthright and honest with issues like his family finances and the ski incident. I think he handled those questions very well.
  • He admitted errors and wrongdoings, without losing grace.

I’m not saying Mr. Hariri is an angel. He’s a politician after all, and for all we know most of what he said was rehearsed and focus-group-tested by PR agencies. What I’m saying is that he’s starting to sound more like an effective politician: Calm and approachable yet strategic and quick on his feet. This can do wonders to the moral of his supporters and political allies, and this is why I’m calling yesterday’s interview a successful one.

Bonus: Half way through the show, I found out that PM Najib Mikati is also having a live TV interview at the same time as Mr. Hariri. Make no mistake about this, this is not a coincidence. I looked back with amusement at what I wrote three month ago: “PM Najib Mikati has a strange habit of raining on [Mr. Hariri's] parades”.

Do we Need a Lebanese Senate ?

Elias Muhanna (a.k.a Q.N.) on why Lebanon needs an upper chamber in parliament:

The classical benefits are in a country like Lebanon where you have minorities that are construed as confessional, you have a weak center and communities that are concerned about the loss of their freedoms, their ways of life. The idea is that the senate provides a check against all of that. You basically open up the Parliament so that it’s one person one vote so it’s equal suffrage across the country. [...] Anything that bares on confessional issues [has] to be passed through the senate as well. So that way every community no matter how small has a say in the affairs and destiny of the country.

This is great in theory but there’s a big catch: As the standoff between PM Mikati and the FPM demonstrates, the sectarian problem in Lebanon is not simply one of representation, but also one of patronage. The Various sectarian zaims want to have their people represented in the official bureaucracy.

Put another way, imagine an extreme situation of one-man-one-vote suffrage that results in a parliament of 100 Muslims and 28 Christians. The question to ask is: If a Shiaa block has 50 MPs and the Druze only have 5, can you make an argument for equal quotas for the Druze and Shiaas in the high posts of government, even if they’re equally represented in the Senate?

Besides, we already have a sort of defacto Senate. These are the various religious bodies (the council of Maronite Bishops, the higher Shiite council, Dar el Fatwa..etc) which traditionally get up in arms and mobilize the faithful whenever an issue is perceived to threaten the influence of their faith.