News Analysis


19
Aug 10

Michael Young On The Game Theory Between Hariri, Hezbollah and Syria

He thinks that Hariri’s strongest card is declaring confidence in the STL then resigning.

Young argues that Hezbollah wouldn’t in that case be able to find a credible Sunni replacement to work against the international tribunal, since the Sunni public opinion would be strongly behind it.

Fair enough. But Hariri doesn’t seem to be in the mood of playing brinkmanship, as he keeps repeating the mantras of reconciliation and calm.


19
Aug 10

No, Hezbollah Did Not ‘Hand Over The Evidence To The STL’

I noticed that much of the foreign media did not properly convey the nuance of Hezbollah’s handover of their evidence dossier to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL).

To read the headlines, you’d assume that the ‘Party of God’ has cheerfully handed the documents to the United Nation’s tribunal, and is waiting for their judgement. The natural assumption here is that Hezbollah is cooperating with the STL.

The more complex truth is this: Hezbollah does not believe in the STL and its authority. It even wants it to be eliminated. What really happened is that Hezbollah wants to keep things calm with Prime Minister Hariri, so it handed the documents to the Lebanese authorities (not to the STL). The Lebanese authorities then handed over the documents to the STL.

This handover by proxy reminds us of Hezbollah’s negotiations with Israel using a (usually German) proxy. This is a typical Hezbollah tactic for getting things both ways: It shows that it is cooperating, but it does not concede legitimacy to the STL and reserves any future right to completely denounce their findings.


14
Aug 10

“The end stages of a brokered settlement”

Hey, Lebanon watchers, don’t be fooled by the commotion in Lebanese politics, the Hezbollah presentations and all that talk of war. These are simply the birth pangs of a final settlement that was already reached, argues Steven Heydemann in Foreign Policy:

The trade-off at the core of the settlement is the acceptance by all parties of the tribunal’s findings, the rejection by Hezbollah of any official role in the assassination and of any links that might emerge between individuals named in the indictments and the movement’s leadership, and acceptance by Saad Hariri of Hezbollah’s claims that to the extent its operatives were associated with the assassination, they were acting as rogue elements-perhaps under Israeli control — and not on behalf of Hezbollah’s leadership. Hariri might hope to use the tribunal to exact concessions on the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons. This is unlikely to happen. Nasrallah and Syria, on their part, have hoped to be able to pressure Hariri to reject the tribunal’s findings and bring the investigation into his father’s death to an inconclusive end. This too is unlikely to happen. The most likely outcome is that the broad terms of this settlement will hold, the current government will remain intact, and the Lebanese political system will have moved, if only by a couple of notches, in directions that enhance the influence of Saudi Arabia and Syria and erode slightly the standing of Iran as a player in Lebanon’s political arena.

I’m not too sure though. We’re talking here about two huge concessions: P.M. Hariri sacrificing a tribunal that brings real justice to his family, and Hezbollah accepting that there are rogue elements within its ranks. Will these cancel each other? Who knows? Worse things have happened during grand bargains.


10
Aug 10

“The Most Important Part Of Sayyed Nasrallah’s Speech”

One of my readers sent me an email with what he thinks is the absolutely most important part of the Sayyed’s presentation:

Nasrallah affirmed there was a Hizbullah unit operating in the St. George area day of the assassination…He showed alleged Israeli aerial spy videos of Beirut and spoke of an Israeli spy in the area to provide the rationale for a Hizbullah cell being present in the location during the assassination and which he and others expect the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) now has solid proof on. He says they were present to track an Israeli collaborator.

In other words, Hezbollah’s mention of an Israeli collaborator in the crime scene was both an offensive and a defensive move.
Thanks F.


5
Aug 10

More On The Complex Relationship Between Hezbollah and the Lebanese Army

Nadim Koteich argues that the Army could serve as useful fig leaf for Hezbollah in the future:

In contrast with the war it initiated in 2006, today there can be no better excuse for Hezbollah to engage in a war with Israel than joining one in support of the Lebanese army and other state institutions. Such a strategy would save Hezbollah any public disapproval and would make it hard for political parties to blame Hezbollah for the consequences.

Sounds diabolical. But for this to be successful, there should be a sort of complicity from the Army:

This would require, however, an under-the-table deal with factions of the army loyal to Hezbollah, a matter on which many observers have little information, yet enormous suspicions.

This would be very serious. Israel is already calling this the “Hezbollisation of the Lebanese Army” but I don’t think this is an accurate characterization. It’s true that Hezbollah has many supporters in the rank and file of the armed forces, but what matters is the clarity of strategy within the top command. All parties should strive to make the army’s strategy more in line with the Lebanese government than with Hezbollah’s sponsors.


4
Aug 10

Hezbollah And Lebanese Army are “Frenemies”

As Angie Nassar notes in NowLebanon‘s Blog, the army and Hezbollah are both competitors and partners:

Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah was in true frenemy form on Tuesday. He kept the Resistance out of the Lebanon-Israeli border clashes and praised the army’s efforts as courageous. Further, he said, “The LAF protects the Resistance, just as the Resistance protects the LAF, and the Lebanese people protect the LAF and the Resistance. This is the formula.


3
Aug 10

The “principle of voluntariness”

Der Spiegel, not a stranger to scoops (fabrications?) when it comes to the Hariri tribunal, appears to have some new inside information:

In a classified letter, the prime minister [Hariri] informed the tribunal that Beirut security forces have refused to make arrests of Hezbollah members. Instead, the talk remains of the “principle of voluntariness.

In other words, Hezbollah will have to, in its own free will surrender members charged by the tribunal. So is that impossible? Not according to “intelligence agencies” the magazine sites:

Intelligence agencies have information about a meeting between Nasrallah and Hassan Mahdawi, the representative of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard in Lebanon. At the meeting Nasrallah is said to have agreed “in an emergency” to allow the main suspects, Abd al-Majid Ghalush and Hajj Salim, to fall and to claim that they were manipulated by foreign intelligence agencies. Iran, known as a financial backer of Hezbollah, does not want to be named in the Hariri murder in any context, Mahdawi allegedly stated.

The question is, what do they mean by “in an emergency”. A war with Israel? A lurching into civil war? And who are those “Intelligence agencies?”

I think the Spiegl is baiting Hezbollah. Remember, the party of God has diagnosed the threat as one against its credibility and reputation, in which any flexibility is perceived as an admission of guilt. This is why it’s not giving in one inch when it comes to any member of the party. And they keep stressing this point again and again, and their leader Sayyed Nassrallah will probably do the same tonight.


30
Jul 10

❊ The Qatari Emir’s Trip to Lebanon

I find the Emir’s visit to Lebanon quite significant. It is a known fact that Hezbollah prefers the Emir of Qatar over the Saudi King as an arbitrator, and the Emir is obviously enjoying that role. He pointedly came at the same day as the Saudi King and the Syrian President without crossing their paths. He will spend more time in Lebanon and unlike the others, he will visit the Lebanese south.

A lot has been made of the fact the the Syrian president came with the Saudi Monarch. The takeaway was that President Assad and King Abdallah represented both sides of the Lebanese divide, and that they could together calm things down. That analysis ignores the possibility that Assad could have “sold out” Hezbollah. The party of God continue to look warily at Syria’s acrobatics, and is scratching its head trying to guess what Syria’s quid-pro-quo could be.

Enter the Emir of Qatar, who likes to portray himself as an independent broker. Hezbollah likes to give weight to the Emir as a way of kicking Saudi Arabia’s authority in the side. I Expect a lot of rice to be thrown at him in southern villages in the upcoming days.

One thing is for sure, things remain in flow and the coming few months remain uncertain for Lebanon.


Note: Posts with titles starting with an ❊ (asterisk) are my opinion posts. I used this system to separate long posts from quick links and comments.