Bending with the wind, March 14 was apparently neither shocked nor awed.

A new theory that is gaining currency is that March 14 intentionally turned the other cheek (and handed their weapons) to let Hezbollah and its allies fall into a trap. Here are some of the arguments being made to support that theory:

From Lebanon Updates: “Hezbollah’s failed Shock and Awe“:

In retrospect, March 14’s rather unexpected giving up its locations to the Army was quite a smart thing to do, assuming Hezbollah won’t fight the army’s present in March 14’s regional offices. This effectively takes away the violence option from Hezbollah.

That leaves Hezbollah with two problems: one is that time is running out so they have to take the initiative, something the guerrilla organization doesn’t have much experience with: changing from countering Israel’s aggression towards defining the agenda requires a change in approach that it might find difficult to make.

Second, up until now, Hezbollah has pretty much always used violence as its strategy of last resort negotiations. Now with the Army stepping in, that card is of the table, leaving Hezbollah with little choice but to explore new ways of getting what it wants: true dialogue.

Guy Bechor, Ynet News: Nasrallah lost, for now:

Just like in the crisis of December 2006, when tens of thousands of Shiites besieged Siniora’s government palace, the same happened this time around: Prime Minister Siniora adopted the tactic of weakness. This is the same tactic he used against us during the Second Lebanon War, when he broke into tears in order to exert international pressure on Israel.

Siniora is a true artist when it comes to understanding the Middle East. He did not fall into the trap of Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah and did not unleash the Lebanese army against Hizbullah’s fighters. Had he done so, Nasrallah would have taken advantage of it and really taken over Beirut. Instead, Siniora allowed Hizbullah to enter areas it doesn’t belong in, thus making Nasrallah fall into a trap himself.

And of course, the previously mentioned Rex Brynen of McGill University:

First, there was the 2006 war, which Hizbullah clearly did not foresee (although it was quite foreseeable). As it turns out they secured their “divine victory” because the Israelis made even more serious mistakes, but it certainly wasn’t a triumph of strategic master thought.

Then there was the withdrawal from cabinet, and the “tent camp” siege of the government–which turned out to NOT to have the rapid and decisive effect that Hizbullah intended. Nasrallah seems to have never anticipated that he would simply be ignored, and that it would be business as usual in the Grand Serail.

Finally, there is the take-over of West Beirut. While the rather foolish and incautious cabinet decisions were the cause of this, I think it was also driven by Hizbullah’s continuing inability to leverage M14 as much as they wanted to. The withdrawal of fighters from the street (albeit, after some very thuggish behaviour by their Amal and SSNP proxies) was clearly intended to spin this all as a reluctant Hizbullah with a national agenda (rather than a sectarian move), they’ve clearly underestimated the effect in the Christian community where it has all done substantial damage to Aoun (a fact that even his most loyal deputies are privately admitting). Given that the Christian community is the only one in play–the Shiite, Sunni, and Druze communities are all pretty much solidly behind the Hizbullah/Amal, Mustaqbal, and the PSP respectively, and now even more so–the long term result could be a politically weakened M8. Ironically, this comes at a time when M14’s weak government performance were causing it some real problems with its constituents–however, events in Beirut will now counter that with a “rally around the (sectarian) flag” effect.

It is also possible that the M14 groups will now do some serious arming and training (despite all the accusations, their past efforts have been VERY limited and haphazard), probably with Saudi/Jordanian/Egyptian support–not really in Hizbullah’s long-term advantage.

Finally, what does Hizbullah do if M14 just ignores Hizbullah’s obvious preeminent military power? I suspect they’ll do exactly that: not soften on the “presidential package” (next cabinet/PM, new electoral law), leaving Hizbullah no better off than before. Indeed, given the damage M8 has taken in non-Shiite communities, in a few months it could even be in a somewhat worse position.

In short, I think this is far from being an unalloyed masterstroke of strategic brilliance.

Elie Fawaz’s article at Michael Totten’s blog:

“So, we know that Hezbollah’s well-trained fighters are in control of most of west Beirut. The decision taken by Walid Jumblat and Saad al-Hariri not to fight back in Beirut, but rather hand most of their positions to the army ended any illusion regarding the sanctity of the “resistance” – that it would never turn its weapons inward, for now its hands are dripping with the blood of innocent Lebanese. But it’s different in the Chouf where Jumblatt’s forces bloodied Hezbollah.

And finally top it with a personal “i told you so“

“shock and awe” is a deliberate tactic by Nassrallah for cowing the Lebanese. If we are neither shocked, nor awed, we will take away Hezbollah’s psychological advantage. If on the other hands March 14 fights fire with fire, they will help feed Hezbollah’s supporters’ sense of victimization and prolong their “resistance”.

Can Hezbollah maintain control of hostile Beirut?

Hezbollah the occupiers… Looks familiar? (Photo: Reuters)

The impressive invading powers swept through the place and all defenses melted away. No, I’m not talking about the Americans who initially breezed through Iraq 5 years ago, I’m talking about Hezbollah’s “Gaza scenario”: The purge of the Future Movement’s offices, social centers, MPs residences and media last night.

Apparently, the Future Movement’s security personnel “dropped their guns” and “ran away” at the first sights of Hezbollah soldiers. Even Future TV, March 14’s pulpit has stopped broadcasting for fear for the safety of their staff. But have we seen the end of this? Will Hezbollah maintain its control on Sunni neighborhoods? Of all people, Hezbollah should know better.

5 years later, the Americans have learned that their mission was not accomplished. Expect the fight for Beirut to begin in earnest later with the distinct trademark of an occupied population: Hit and run. Meanwhile, Future TV will resume broadcasting soon (Maybe from Tripoli?), but what matters is this: The world has seen the real face of Hezbollah.

Some observations into Sayyed Hassan Nassrallah’s speech.

Pointing the finger… (Photo credit: Reuters)

1- He was trying to pacify those I would call “wavering Sunnis”, impressionable Muslims — Lebanese or Arabs — who are not completely sold on the ideas of March 14 and still regard America as Lebanon’s #1 enemy.

2- He was targeting Mr. Walid Jumblat, a Druze, instead of Mr. Seniora, to attempt to avoid the Sunni backlash that scuttled his previous plans to topple the government. I think it’s a bit late for that.

3- He tried to evoke Hezbollah’s mythical image: “If we wanted to stage a coup, the entire government would wake up one day in Prison before they even realize it”. Of course, that’s not true, but it can be helpful for his supporters’ morale.

4- There was a high undertone of us-versus-them in his speech, and he never made an effort to defend his non-shia allies. That confirms the theory that the Shiaas are headed in an isolationist direction.

5- (From Lebanese-forces.com) There was no mention whatsoever in Mr. Nassrallah’s speech of the airport’s container cameras which started this entire kerkfuffle.

Please send in your valuable thoughts so that I could add them to the list.

Faced with a determined government, an increasingly isolated party resorts to desperate measures.

Blocking the road to the airport. (Photo credit: Reuters)

Today, Hezbollah needed a big fig leaf to cover its naked security assault on the government, on March 14 and on the average Lebanese citizen. Unfortunately for them, the cover the labor protests offered didn’t last much. It fell off as soon as Hezbollah’s own roadblocks prevented their hungry comrades from protesting. The party of god went on and raised the stakes, deciding to block off the roads to the airport “until the government withdraws its latest decisions”, namely those to unseat Hezbollah’s security officer in the Airport and dismantle their private communications network.

Is this a war Hezbollah can win?

Two signs indicate that it’s not. The first is the meagre turnout in Christian areas in today’s supposedly national demonstrations. Except in hardcore holdouts like in Mr. Sleiman Frangieh’s Zgharta, life looked normal in Jbeil, Kessrouan and Metn. It was, as one blogger puts it, a “grey Wednesday”, unlike last year’s “black Tuesday”. It is becoming increasingly obvious that Hezbollah’s Christian allies no longer have the stomach for Hezbollah’s bloody brand of resistance against Mr. Seniora’s government. Hezbollah’s support, in other words, is being reduced to its core Shiaa constituency.

The second sign is Hezbollah’s decision to block the airport’s road, which is seen as a huge gamble. Unlike the Beirut central district where they managed to camp for 500 days, every single Lebanese uses the Beirut RHI Airport, and blocking its roads will prove unsustainable. The summer season beckons and Lebanese diaspora from all sects will want to visit home. Shiaas especially send large amounts of cash to Hezbollah by stuffing their luggages with well hidden dollars from Africa and South America. Pressures on Hezbollah will mount from within and from without to clear up the Airport road. Expect Mr. Nassrallah tomorrow to announce a “magnanimous” order to clear the roads.

This has become a high-stakes game of chicken between the suddenly-bold government and the waning Hezbollah. The party that blinks first will lose big, and the bad news for Hezbollah is that time is not on their side.

The conditions are not yet ripe for another round of 7iwar.

More talking, less results.

After a 2-month vacation, majority leader Mr. Saad Hariri looked fresh and bouncy holding talks with the various political a religious figures. Mr. Hariri even had the energy to extend Mr. Berri a deal on behalf of March 14:

“We support a qada-based parliamentary election law and we support the formation of a national unity government as well as any other proposed settlements, but we cannot achieve all that without a president.”

To the untrained ear, these sound like concessions to the oppositions’ main demands. But a qada-based election is not the same as the electoral law of 1960 that the opposition is demanding, and the “national unity government” had a catch: It was “as proposed in the Arab initiative”, i.e. without the blocking third, arguably the most important opposition demand and the reason this entire stand-off began. Not to mention the pre-condition of electing Mr. Suleiman, which — if it happens — removes all bargaining power from the opposition.

Of course, Hezbollah was not impressed. Al-Akhbar, their mouthpiece, did today what it does best: Thrust Mr. Aoun to the forefront.
In their main story today, Al-akhbar highlighted Mr. Aoun’s view that the dialogue Mr. Hariri and Mr. Berri are cooking up is just another attempt to resurrect the quadripartite alliance (an electoral alliance of the 4 Moslem parties at the expense of Christians that resulted in a backlash that propped Mr. Aoun).

That’s not all. The plan, Mr. Aoun said, was part of an elaborate Saudi-funded scheme to undermine his popularity by buying off people in Christian areas, and turning ex-allies like Michel el Murr against him.

Hezbollah in turn said that they will not take part of any deal that will undermine their “imporant allies,” in reference to Mr Aoun. In other words, hold the champaign, May 13 is just another date.

Can Syria wiggle its way out of what seems like a tight stick-and-carrot trap?

Will the Golan sway Assad? (Photo credit: AFP)

Very few people would like to be in Bashar Al Assad’s shoes nowadays. The corner the regime has trapped itself in suddenly looks very suffocating. In Lebanon, Syria’s hands are tied. True it has managed to successfully prevent the election of a new President up till now, but that’s about as far as Damascus’ influence can go. The international Tribunalis getting closer by the day, and the ruling March 14 government headed by Mr. Seniora lives on to oversee it.

But Syria’s real problems are outside of Lebanon. Today, CIA officers will be briefing American lawmakers on “proof” that there was a cooperation between North Korea and Syria on a nuclear weapons program. The proof will include video footage of North Koreans working in the very facility Israel had bombed last September. This will be enough to guarantee a media onslaught on Syria and a perfectly neat excuse for a potential future strike by Israel.

Is there a way for Assad out of the potential repercussions? Turkey’s Prime Minister whispered in his ears that there is: The Israelis, he said, are ready to exchange the Golan heights for peace (withholding support from hardline groups). In normal circumstances, the Syrians would have played hard to get, pretended to go along and then backtrack. But these are desperate times in Damascus, and perhaps, just perhaps, things might be different this time.