Just in case you think that this thing is winding down, think again. I’ve said this before, but now Elie Fawwaz writes at Michael Totten’s Blog about the expected push back against Hezbollah.

Did Hezbollah make a big mistake? Is it Bush’s fault? What will Israel do now?

(photo credit: AFP)

The Daily KOS (American activist Left blog, leans towards Obama), makes the argument that Lebanon is already messed up and that someone as incompetent as Bush shouldn’t have made it worse by meddling with it:

Given Lebanon’s vexed history since the 1940’s, one can’t honestly say that even if the US had handled the Lebanese situation more adroitly—by taking a smaller, quieter role instead of using internal Lebanese developments as evidence of the salubrious effects on Arab democracy supposedly brought about by our invasion of Iraq—that Lebanon would have avoided a power struggle between Hezbollah and the Sunni-Druze led government.

But yet again, the Bush administration bumbled in to a complex situation in the Middle East, and made pronouncements that demonstrated its ignorance and dangerous naivety. And once again, a situation arises where, because of our invasion and occupation of Iraq, we have no credibility to intervene diplomatically or help bring about a situation that would be both better for the local population and most likely less likely to empower declared adversaries of the United States.

Rex Brynen, of McGill University argues that Hezbollah has made a big mistake , something which it lately seems to be making a habit of:

First, there was the 2006 war, which Hizbullah clearly did not foresee (although it was quite foreseeable). As it turns out they secured their “divine victory” because the Israelis made even more serious mistakes, but it certainly wasn’t a triumph of strategic master thought.

Then there was the withdrawal from cabinet, and the “tent camp” siege of the government–which turned out to NOT to have the rapid and decisive effect that Hizbullah intended. Nasrallah seems to have never anticipated that he would simply be ignored, and that it would be business as usual in the Grand Serail.

Finally, there is the take-over of West Beirut. While the rather foolish and incautious cabinet decisions were the cause of this, I think it was also driven by Hizbullah’s continuing inability to leverage M14 as much as they wanted to. The withdrawal of fighters from the street (albeit, after some very thuggish behaviour by their Amal and SSNP proxies) was clearly intended to spin this all as a reluctant Hizbullah with a national agenda (rather than a sectarian move), they’ve clearly underestimated the effect in the Christian community where it has all done substantial damage to Aoun (a fact that even his most loyal deputies are privately admitting). Given that the Christian community is the only one in play–the Shiite, Sunni, and Druze communities are all pretty much solidly behind the Hizbullah/Amal, Mustaqbal, and the PSP respectively, and now even more so–the long term result could be a politically weakened M8. Ironically, this comes at a time when M14’s weak government performance were causing it some real problems with its constituents–however, events in Beirut will now counter that with a “rally around the (sectarian) flag” effect.

It is also possible that the M14 groups will now do some serious arming and training (despite all the accusations, their past efforts have been VERY limited and haphazard), probably with Saudi/Jordanian/Egyptian support–not really in Hizbullah’s long-term advantage.

Finally, what does Hizbullah do if M14 just ignores Hizbullah’s obvious preeminent military power? I suspect they’ll do exactly that: not soften on the “presidential package” (next cabinet/PM, new electoral law), leaving Hizbullah no better off than before. Indeed, given the damage M8 has taken in non-Shiite communities, in a few months it could even be in a somewhat worse position.

In short, I think this is far from being an unalloyed masterstroke of strategic brilliance.

Over at Israel, they are not happy at the Lebanese army’s perceived compliance with Hezbollah. Yoav Stgern writes in Haaretz:

The close ties between the army and Hezbollah go beyond the recent battles. They also extend to south Lebanon. Under UN resolution 1701, the Lebanon Army was to deploy in the south and thus take up places occupied by Hezbollah, something that had raised hopes in Israel. Today, UNIFIL and the Lebanon Army respond to every incident in south Lebanon, but the presence of the army has no real significance there. At the moment of truth, the army will follow Hezbollah’s orders, diplomatic sources believe.

But the Israelis are spotting an opportunity: (In a nutshell, “Phew, now that Hezbollah are the rulers, we can bomb the Entire friggin’ country to pieces…”)

Former IDF chief of staff Amnon Lipkin-Shahak said Sunday Hezbollah’s persistent attempts to take over Lebanon could eventually benefit Israel in its struggle against the militant group.

“If an armed conflict erupts it will be simpler to strike Lebanon when Hezbollah is the legitimate ruler,” Shahak told the Army Radio.

Earlier on Sunday, Israel’s Vice Premier Haim Ramon told cabinet members that Lebanon must be viewed as a “Hezbollah state,” after the Shiite guerilla group seized control over the western part of the Lebanese capital over the weekend.

“Lebanon has no government. It is a fiction, there is only Hezbollah,” Ramon said during the weekly cabinet meeting. “Hezbollah is directly responsible for everything that happens [in Lebanon], and the organization completely controls the state.”

I’d like to hear your thoughts and reactions..

After the Future TV Network, The official website of the Lebanese forces was shut down by Hezbollah’s “freedom fighters”. I was told that the site will be back in around 2 hours.

Remember, this war is against the freedom of speech. Make sure you tell the world about that!

Pundits are starting to analyze the meaning of what happened in Lebanon.

First, here’s my absolute favorite metaphor of the situation, courtesy of Hot Air:

…The government [was] temporarily brought to its knees to remind it who’s boss. Think of it as a visit from mafia goons to some poor bastard who’s late in repaying his debt to a loan shark — they broke a couple of fingers this time to let him know they can break his neck if he doesn’t play ball.

So, what lessons can the West learn from what happened in Lebanon? Noah Pollak in Contentions suggests an answer:

What does the crisis in Lebanon teach us about Hezbollah? It teaches us the same lesson we learned from Hamas when it took Gaza: Islamic supremacist groups, despite their claims to the contrary, cannot be integrated into states or democratic political systems.

[…] The Hezbollah rampage in Lebanon that we are witnessing should make it obvious to any sentient observer that Hezbollah’s claims to democratic political legitimacy have always been intended only to manipulate the credulous. Participation in politics requires the willingness to persuade your foes, to compromise, to stand down when you don’t get your way. But there is no record of Hamas or Hezbollah ever observing such restrictions: the moment Hezbollah was confronted with political pressure, it responded not within the political sphere, but with warlordism — with an exhibition of violence intended to make clear not just that Hezbollah is the most powerful force in the country, but that challenging it will result in its enemies’ humiliation and dispossession. In the streets of Beirut, with Kalashnikovs and RPGs, Hezbollah is making it abundantly clear that its participation in Lebanese politics ends when Hezbollah is asked to submit to the state’s authority. How many more Middle East “experts” are going to proclaim that the answer to Islamic supremacism is dialogue and political integration?

An on the ground reporter, Ghaith Abdul Ahad, pens a descriptive article for The Guardian on how the fighting on the ground was taking place. Here’s a sample:

Like a traffic conductor, he organised the stone throwing at Sunnis across the street, raising his arm for a volley to start and then pushing back the teenagers to stop. But Nasrallah’s speech put an end to that. The teenagers disappeared and in their place, about 20 Shia gunmen, Hizbullah gunmen, took up their positions on the street corners. The game had changed.

“Wait,” the commander called, “don’t start shooting before the army withdraws.” As soon as the last of the soldiers separating the groups ran into armoured vehicles the fighting began.

Read the whole thing…

Jade at Blacksmiths Of Lebanon reports on the latest efforts to solve the crisis which seem to be bearing some fruits..Read more..

It remains to be seen if the circle of violence can be abated. There is already blood on both sides and the streets are boiling for revenge and counter revenge. Cooler heads should be louder and more persuasive.