Could the S-S discussions be even more of a grand bargain than we thought? Speaker Nabih Berri:
the problem in Lebanon does not only lie in the international tribunal. There is a bigger problem which is the Taef Accord [...] The Taef Agreement is the best for now and has no alternative but we have to agree on how to implement it entirely [...] This is part of the Syrian-Saudi initiative
When Berri talks of implementing Taef in its entirety, it is usually seen as a stick he carries to scare Christians, since the Taef requires an eventual desecularization of Lebanon, an outcome that is anathema to non-Shiaas.
Back to the discussion at hand. If what Mr. Berri is saying is true, this means that the discussions will have a far greater impact than thought. But I think Mr. Berri is bluffing: The Christians and the Druze will have to sign on to this . There are no indications that the leaders of those communities are involved at all in the S-S talks. (How’s that secrecy working out for you now Mr. Jumblat?)
Expanding the scope of the discussions seems like a bid to play for time. The fact that Mr. Berri is taking part of this is very interesting.
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“desecularization” ? I think you mean “abolition of the sectarian system.”
In any case, I think that any “threat” of abolition of the sectarian system is pure bluff. Majority rule would at least mean submitting the weapons of Hezbollah to a referendum, which is something Hezbollah will never agree to despite all what it might claim, because Iran needs not only the presence of these weapons, but also an absolute control over them. A recent Aftenposten wikileak revealed that the Israelis consider Hezbollah and its 40000 rockets the most potent weapon of Iran against Israel, while Iran has only 300 Shihab rockets that can reach Israel when fired from Iran, for which Israel would have a 12 minutes advance warning before impact.
On the other hand, any agreement that would considerably strengthen the Syrian hand in Lebanon, would necessarily result in Syria having a greater responsibility in keeping Hezbollah under control. If Tel Aviv is attacked with missiles of 500 kg warheads, while the Syrians control air, sea, and land borders of Lebanon, I really don’t think Syria will be spared in the conflict. That’s why, IMO, Syria can’t afford a much larger piece of Lebanese pie than the one it has now.
I think that March 8 is now facing a dilemma, in spite of the military superiority of Hezbollah over the other actors, including the Lebanese Army. If Hezbollah tries to take over the country, it will be exposed to huge risks: First, the possibility of resistance by the Lebanese Army, the risk of economic disaster (given the large part of the economy that is dependent on tourism from the Gulf and EU, and the expatriate remittances), the risk of an even more tarnished reputation in the Arab world, etc. At the same time Syria cannot take back the place it had in Lebanon in the nineties: At the time, it could control Hezbollah, now, it can’t even afford to claim that it controls it. At the current time, I think Hezbollah is hoping that its ability to cause trouble will make everybody treat it gently; this approach succeeded to some extent, but actually causing trouble would inevitably come at a cost both for Hezbollah and its foreign sponsors.