Whether or not to add a Lebanese front to the Gaza war is a very difficult decision for Hezbollah.

So far, Mr. Nassrallah is only using his “soft power”. Relying on his prestige and influence among Arab masses, he urged Egyptians to break open the walls of Rafah with their “bare chests”. Whether  his prime-time TV address makes a difference is not clear yet, but Hezbollah has a big question in its mind at this moment: Should it join the war and open another front?

While some might find the question easy to answer, Hezbollah strategists and game theorists have their work cut out for them; not joining the war is risky because it would demonstrate that the 2006 war did put an end to Hezbollah’s ability to poke Israel when it wants to relieve Hamas. That would undermine Hezbollah’s entire narrative of victory against Israel in 2006 and show weakness.

At the same time, joining the war isn’t easy. Lebanon is not yet ready for a re-run of July 2006, and Mr. Nassrallah knows that the Israelis would be even more deadly and ruthless this time around. The Lebanese President and the minister of Defense pointedly made the point from the southern border that while we should all vocally protest the Israeli aggression on Gaza, Lebanon is no launching pad for Missiles.

There are other reasons why Hezbollah should think twice before joining Hamas in its fight. The cheap price of oil has put a financial strain on Hezbollah’s main backer Iran. This means that reimbursing people whose houses were destroyed will not be easy this time, let alone replenishing their stocks of expensive missiles.

Also, by joining the war Hezbollah risks postponing Lebanese parliamentary elections scheduled for early 2009. As things stand, Hezbollah and its allies have a decent shot at gaining a majority in the parliament and rolling back last last 3 years of anti-Syrian dominance. Politically, Hezbollah is right where it wants to be at this moment and the last thing it needs is a war that might compromise its internal standing.

So what is a Party of God to do? 

Do what Sayyed Hassan is doing: Use strong rhetoric and secretly hope that international and Arab pressure will end the war as soon as possible. If all else fails, provoke the Israelis into doing something stupid in Lebanon and pounce on the opportunity. After all, as they all say: “They started this!”

The average Lebanese are cheering the Russian deal. But a closer look should give them pause for thought.

It was by all means a feat by our Minister of defense Mr. Elias El Murr. As he toasted his celebratory vodka with his Russian counterpart, he must have predicted how the Lebanese, people and media, would be overjoyed by the promised spectacle of modern fighter jets wearing a cedar tree.

Politicians are rushing to embrace the story. To March 14, it’s “proof to Syria that Lebanon is an independent and sovereign country” as the Hariri-owned Al-Mustaqbal newspaper put it. To the Hezbollah and Arabist types, it’s an act of liberation from an Israeli-imposed ban on weapon sales to this country.

But regardless of which point of view you come from, it will not be hard for you to notice –after the party is over and the corks are swept away– that the Mig-29s could be a meal that the Lebanese will find hard to digest.

Not withstanding the political headache of of assigning pilots and staff to the liking of all sides, the economics of such a deal are ominous; as the Lebanese daily Assafir puts it:

?? ??? ??? ????? ?????? ?? ?????? ???????? ???? ?? ????? ??? ?????? ?????? ?? ????? ???????? ??? ????? ?????? ??????? ??? ???»??? ??«. ???? ?? ????? ????? ??? ??? ?? ????? ????? ?????? ?? ????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ???? ????? ?? ????????. ??? ?? ??? ????? ???? ??? ????? ???????? ????? ??????? ?????? ?? ???????? ????? ????????? ??????? ????? ????????? ?????? ??????? ???.

Translation: Are we capable of setting up an entire (military) system that begins with sending 30 Lebanese army officers -at least- to train as pilots for the Mig-29s, in addition to one hundred soldiers tasked with learning how to fully maintain such fighter jets? Not to mention the necessity of refurbishing and maintaining Lebanese airbases and hangars that would accommodate those planes.

The deal specifically states that the costs of maintaining and training the Migs should be borne by the Lebanese state. The same state, mind you, that is struggling to pay for teachers and workers and whose finances are so strained we had to beg for ParisII donors and their humiliating strings.

So the costs are high but the benefits should be worth it, right? I’m not too sure. Will 10 Mig-29s be sufficient to affect the balance of power with Israel? Would they present any form of military deterrence? What guarantees that the Israelis won’t just wipe them out in one preemptive strike like it did to the Egyptian Air Force back in 1967?

In other words, the Lebanese are about to take ownership of very expensive showpieces that would most likely just end up lying around.