Are we moving towards the post-March 14 era?

Fares Soueid, the General Secretary of March 14 loves the big picture. You often find him in various TV station talk shows, talking about grand schemes and lofty ideals, long-term projects and sophisticated theories about the Christians in the East and how the March 14 alliance can restore their influence. Yet when it comes to the nitty-gritty of politics, like in the recent infighting over ministerial positions, Mr. Soueid becomes conspicuously absent.

I like to compare the March 14 project to the European Union. A great idea on paper with enormous potential, but when push comes to shove, the nation state becomes the only polity that really matters. Likewise, in March 14, when matters become concrete (a ministerial position here, an election there), the alliance breaks down into its separate sectarian blocks that compete to further their individual interests.

So why insist on having such an umbrella group?

Mr Soueid would perhaps answer that the March 14 project, as imagined by people like Gebran Tueni and Samir Kassir, is an inherently optimistic and hopeful project. A yearning to a time when the Lebanese will move beyond tribalism into the realm of ideas and fair competition.

But as far as this generation is concerned, what really matters is who gets the ministry of public works.

The fight P.M Seniora has picked over Mr. Ali Qanso was unnecessary.

To Mr. Seniora, rejecting Mr. Qanso in his cabinet was a matter of principle:

Sources in Saniora’s office said the premier-designate is “keen on forming a national unity cabinet that would lead the nation to a new era.”

“Qanso’s participation would not serve this purpose because he had threatened to liquidate Mustaqbal Movement members, topped by the movement leader MP Saad Hariri” during clashes between the Hizbullah-led opposition and pro-government gunmen in May.

To March 14, Hezbollah’s proposal of Mr. Qanso was a poison pill that is meant to prevent the formation of the new government in order to embarrass President Sleiman in his upcoming summit in Paris. Add to that the continued violence in Tripoli, which the majority sees as the Syrians’ way of saying “take Qanso or else” (witness Mr. Mouallem’s unsubtle remarks) , and we get ourselves the recipe for a symbolic battle over whether or not Syria should be able to dictate its choices on us by force.

The question is: Was Mr. Qanso worth all this fuss?

There is no doubt that he’s a terrible person. But If Mr. Seniora chose to accept Hezbollah, the main architects of Beirut’s invasion, in his cabinet, then why would he single out Mr. Qanso as a troublemaker? Moreover — to play the devil’s advocate — Mr. Berri is right: The Doha agreement did not confer on Mr. Seniora a veto right on who the opposition can choose to represent it.

Mr. Seniora should climb down as fast as possible in a face-saving way, to avoid this turning this into another high-stakes battle over an essentially insignificant individual. Mr. Seniora is also allowing his critics to accuse him of creating small battles as a distraction from the infighting taking place in the ranks of March 14 over cabinet positions.