If current trends continue, the Free Patriotic Movement’s website will be the champion of all websites in Lebanon very soon.

When I first started blogging right after Hariri was killed, I used to have a daily chart that indicated the different rankings of different websites in Lebanon. It was a nice feature, but it took too much space. This is why I reserved it for events that significantly change those rankings. One such event was the release of the Mehlis report: it propelled the ranking of the FPM’s website to the extend that it toppled that old beacon of March 14: Naharnet.

There are two reasons why the FPM’s website is doing so well.

The first one is reliance:
Michel Aoun heads a party with a significant following in Lebanon (and outside of Lebanon), but unlike other parties, he has no private newspapers and no private Satellite TV stations. At the same time, his exile in Paris required that he found a cost-effective means for communicating with his base.

Unlike in any other Party, the FPM’s website is integral to the party’s operations; while others use theirs (if any) as online brochures, the FPM uses it to communicate, to organize rallies, to publish pieces by its intellectuals, and lately, to gather membership applications.
Michel Aoun is the only Lebanese politician who has an internet address on his podium whenever he makes speeches or organizes press conferences.

The other reason why the FPM’s website is doing well is political. Soon Lebanon will have a new President, and whether some people like it or not, Michel Aoun is the strongest candidate. People are regularly frequenting his website for the latest on his “presidential moves” even if it’s only to “know thy enemy”.

Some might argue that the graph is not fair, since Naharnet.com for instance is part of Annahar group, which also runs Annahar.com and Annaharonline.com. But this post is not about individual websites. It’s about trends; Naharnet can be a fairly representative of the trend of Annahar’s websites, and that trend is downwards in comparison to tayyar.org’s.

Do you want a fun experience? Go to this website and compare the tayyar’s website to others. So far, only Annaharonline.com and Assafir.com beat Tayyar.org (slightly), but Tayyara.org flies above Almustaqbal.com, albaladonline.com and surges way ahead of the puny dailystar.com.lb which is losing readers by the day.

There is an interesting discussion taking place at Syria Comment.

Joshua posted a piece that ended with an inquiry: Are the Syrians/Arabs intrinsicaly violent? Commentators are comming up with various insightful answers.

We shouldn’t have high expectations from Hassan Nassrallah’s sense of nationalism

The secretary General of Hezbollah is about to make a fiery speech to an expected gathering of half a million person. Read what he is expected to say here.(Arabic)

Meanwhile, I thought it would be helpful to publish this Hayya Bina piece, lest we forget where Hezbollah’s real loyalties lie. (Read Arabic version here)

The Sayyed, the general and a loaded gift!

It generates frustration and anger in the hearts and minds of Lebanese citizens, and even of non-Lebanese, to recall the image of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, General Secretary of Hezbollah, bestowing upon Gen. Rustom Ghazale, the head of
Syrian military intelligence in Lebanon, a parting gift of a rifle acquired by the “Resistance” during a raid on the Israeli Army.

This moment was captured in a photo [1] taken during a farewell visit to Nasrallah made by Ghazale on the 20th of April, and was an exchange which marked the completion of the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon and has taken an additional significance since Ghazale was named one of the key suspects in the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri.

Even if we assume that Nasrallah, leader of the only Lebanese party possessing military and security apparatuses, was completely ignorant of the involvement of the Syrian military intelligence forces in the assassination of Rafic Hariri, we surely cannot suppose that he was less aware than the ordinary Lebanese citizen of the Syrian security forces’ involvement in criminal, political and moral crimes against hundreds, even thousands, of Lebanese men and women. Therefore, what conclusions should the Lebanese draw concerning Nasrallah’s bold act of “faithfulness” to Syria, the gifting of a rifle to one of the main figures responsible for these offences?

Detlev Mehlis gave us no doubt of Ghazale’s guilt, so what can Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah do to rectify this dreadful mistake? Will he apologize to the Lebanese citizens? Will he reclaim this gift and return it to its owners ― its Lebanese owners?

The Economist pitches in on the Future of the Syrian regime. It says “[Syria is] A suitable case for behavior modification, not regime change”

(the Illustration above is contributed by The Beirut Spring and was NOT used by The Economist’s Articles in question)

Today’s Economist Issue has two articles about Lebanon and Syria (their online versions require a subscription). The first is a leader, in which it argues that it would be imprudent to seek regime change in Syria. The second is a more general article that describes the What-happened-so-far-and-where-we-are-now of the matter.

The Leader, after explaining why Bashar is “A remarkably inept dictator”, had this to say:

Given that even a not very good dictator is a bad thing, should America and France, which took the lead in squeezing Syria’s army out of Lebanon, now engineer the downfall of the regime itself? That would be a gamble. Mr Assad has purged his country of an effective opposition. It is therefore impossible to know who might take his place if he fell. A clone might emerge from his inner circle, or Syria could be convulsed by a Sunni revolt against the Assads’ minority Alawite clan. In neither case would the Syrian people or their neighbours necessarily benefit. Syria, after all, is not the republic of fear Iraq was under Mr Hussein. Unlike his father (who had some 20,000 people, mostly civilians, slaughtered in the city of Hama in 1982), the younger Mr Assad has not been a mass-murderer, even if he orders the occasional assassination.

Better to use Mr Assad’s present weakness as an opportunity to change Syria’s behaviour, not its regime. In particular, Syria should be made to stop interfering in Lebanon, which its proxies continue to intimidate even though its army has withdrawn; end its support for the Iraqi insurgency; and close the offices of the Palestinian rejectionist organisations that use Damascus as a base from which to organise attacks on Israel and undermine the Palestinian Authority of Mahmoud Abbas.

The Economist also expects that Russia will not keep on protecting Mr. Assad if he doesn’t cooperate fully with the investigation in the future:

In the Security Council this week, the Russians gave a frosty response to a draft resolution from America, France and Britain that would empower Mr Mehlis to complete his investigation and pave the way for sanctions if Syria refuses to co-operate. The Arab League also said it opposed sanctions—for now. But this may not, and should not, be the last word.

Although Syria was a Soviet protégé, and has friends in its foreign ministry, Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, may come to see the folly of protecting a dictator who repels the many Arabs who are tired of their leaders behaving like mafia bosses. To bring Mr Putin on board, however, America would be well advised to pipe down and let France, whose president was a friend of Mr Hariri’s, make the running in the Security Council. If the Syrian regime collapses of its own accord, or at the hand of its own people, so be it. But the world has no appetite for more American-led regime change. Loose talk about that will do more to help than to hurt the deservedly friendless Mr Assad.

In my opinion, the most important part in The Economist’s second article is what it had to say about the Mehlis Report:

The UN report, compiled by a German prosecutor, Detlev Mehlis, presents this background in telling detail. Having established a motive, it goes on to describe a range of incriminating evidence. Most compelling are mobile-phone records that reveal the existence of a wide-ranging conspiracy to eliminate Mr Hariri. These include not just records from a set of callers, linked to the Lebanese and Syrian intelligence agencies, in the immediate vicinity of the crime. One caller, an official in a Syrian-backed Lebanese Islamist sect known as the Ahbash, put in a mysterious direct call to Lebanon’s president only minutes before the blast.

The most damning evidence, however, is more controversial. Mr Mehlis cites two Syrian witnesses as having actually observed the preparation, in a Syrian camp, of the car bomb used for the assassination. But one of these witnesses is a Syrian defector with a history of telling tall tales. He is now being held in France, not as a witness but as a suspect in the murder. Syria has seized on such inconsistencies to challenge the legitimacy of Mr Mehlis’s report, claiming that the investigation has been politicised.

This very much goes against the follies we are still hearing around us of a “politicized report” or a “vague non specific report” (Hassan Nassrallah should be saying this right now as I type in Hezbollah’s celebration of Jerusalem Day)

The LF is not doing enough to change its image.

When the victorious Samir Geagea made that public speech in the Airport when he was released from prison, people were listening to a man speaking like a national leader. It was obvious that Mr. Geagea had made his strategic decision to move the party he leads to more moderate waters. Yesterday, the LF students, in their First Annual Conference, celebrated a “new Lebanon”, one where people are “free to express their opinions”. Mr. Ahmad Fatfat, a Sunni Haririst, was a star speaker of the show.

Yet doubts still remain about how much the LF is actually doing to improve its image. Take the issue of the crucifix shaped as a dagger (a symbol perceived by many to be offensive). In his first interview since he was released from prison Mr. Geagea

‘expressed his surprise and discontent at his party’s adoption of the “dagger cross”. Commenting on the crucifix ending in a dagger that has become synonymous with the Lebanese Forces party, Geagea said: “This is not our motto. Some of the youths who decided to bear it did so after the LF was disbanded. When I was released I was surprised to hear about the dagger-cross.”‘

But if you look at the picture that his followers have unwittingly posted on his website to celebrate his birthday (shown above), it is clear that Mr. Geagea is cutting a cake that has the very symbol he pretended he didn’t know about.

But forget about the past, let’s talk about the future:

‘Geagea explained he has called upon party members not to display the dagger-cross, adding that “an internal memorandum has been issued on that matter.”‘

If that is the case, then why is the symbol still prominently placed on the LF’s website?

I trust That Mr. Geagea’s motives are good. I even understand why he would politically need some time to move his base with him. But in his interview he seemed willing to take the first symbolic step; so please Mr. Geagea, start with your official website.

**Erratum**
It was brought to my attention that http://www.lebaneseforces.com is NOT the LF’s official website. Their official website is http://www.lebanese-forces.com.
Thanks Khaled and Anonymous

Two statements by two different men can be taken for face value, or understood cynically. This post gives them the benefit of the doubt.

1- Patriarch Sfeir said that the Presidency has to be highly respected.

Cynical interpretation: The Patriarch would rather have a criminal Christian at the top than see his mandate shortened. In other words: President Lahhoud should stay.

Benefit of the doubt: The Christians are squabbling among themselves and they can’t make up their minds yet on who should be the next President. The Patriarch just wants to give this power struggle its due time.

2- John Bolton said that the investigation should be able to interview President Assad.

Cynical interpretation: The Americans want to humiliate yet another Arab Leader.

Benefit of the Doubt: The Americans are trying to make it easier for Bashar to broker a deal with them at the expense of Assef shawkat and other men who could be more powerful than him.